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PROLOGUE
Imagine you are ten years old. You are proud and honored that
one of the most revered, respected, and loved men in your commu-
nity pays you special attention-he gives you gifts, and invites you
to go on special trips. A man who, in your eyes, your friends' eyes,
and the eyes of your parents, is the embodiment of God. He is
your local parish priest. But he is the furthest thing from God. He
has betrayed you, the parish, the community, his vows, and God-
he has repeatedly sexually molested you.
Now suppose that your trusted bishop knew this priest was a
pedophile. Suppose the bishop not only knew the priest had sexu-
ally molested parish youth, but had hidden that fact, both from
members of the church and the laity. Rather, the bishop
clandestinely placed the priest in the parish without any precau-
tions. Reading this, it would seem obvious that the diocese or any
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other church defendant, like any other employer, would be held
legally responsible for the harm caused by its reckless conduct.
Even the most fertile imagination cannot create or divine a lawful,
just, or defensible reason why any church defendant should be
treated differently than any other entity that places children in
harm's way. Especially, when the church defendant does not dis-
pute that the abuse occurred, that it knew about the priest's "prob-
lem," or that it played a significant part in allowing it to happen.
How, then, does a church demur in a situation as described above?
In an act of unparalleled audacity and brazen legal maneuvering,
the church often argues that the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides it unfettered immunity and insulation
from any accountability to its parishioners or society at large. In so
doing, the church perverts our nation's constitution into a form of
unholy absolution for the most unholy of acts. This argument,
however, is of no avail to the church-it has sought refuge in a
legal illusion.
The First Amendment contains two clauses addressing religion-
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.' First
Amendment jurisprudence also addresses religion through the ju-
dicial abstention doctrine.2 While these rights are firmly estab-
lished, their limits and boundaries continue to be defined today.
The nation's highest court has yet to address the issue of
whether, in the name of the First Amendment, religious institutions
can be shielded from otherwise cognizable tort claims caused by
their agents and employees.3 In cases of sexual abuse that involve
church defendants, tort claims usually allege negligence, negligent
supervision, negligent retention, breach of fiduciary duty, and vica-
rious liability.4 Most state courts have held that the First Amend-
ment does not provide any protection from these claims.' As the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. These guarantees enumerated in the Constitution have
been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 353 (Fla. 2002).
4. See generally Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sex-
ual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 1, 28-31 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of Church of Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349 (Ariz. App.
2002); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996); Moses v.
Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Destafano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275
(Colo. 1988); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002); Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d
1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996);
Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul &
Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697
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Florida Supreme Court recently stated, "to hold otherwise and im-
munize the Church Defendants from suit could risk placing relig-
ious institutions in a preferred position over secular institutions, a
concept both foreign and hostile to the First Amendment."6
As this Article will explain, the Constitution does not provide a
religious institution the right or privilege to operate as a law unto
itself-the institution must comply with the law of civil govern-
ment. Part I will provide a brief introduction and background on
the First Amendment. Parts II, III, and IV will analyze the Free
Exercise Clause, judicial abstention doctrine, and the Establish-
ment Clause, respectively, and how each operates in relation to
sexual abuse claims against clergy.
INTRODUCTION
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the
business of civil government from that of religion and to settle
the just bounds that lie between the one and the other.7
The need to distinguish between government and religion was as
clear and salient to John Locke in 1687 as it is to our nation today.
Written over three centuries ago, his words indicate that the strug-
gle between protecting the freedom to practice religion while main-
taining a civil government had formed long before the Constitution
and Bill of Rights were enacted. As history has shown, establishing
a line separating the secular from the sectarian in American life has
(N.J. 1997); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div.
1997); Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Byrd v. Faber, 565
N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989);
Martinez v. Primera Asemblea de Dios, Inc., No. 05-96-01458, 1998 WL 242412 (Tex.
Ct. App. May 15, 1998); C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262
(Wash. 1999). But see Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So.2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Bryan R.
v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999); Teadt v. Lutheran
Church Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Gibson v. Brewer, 952
S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb.
1993); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995). Most fed-
eral courts have also found that the First Amendment does not insulate the Church
from liability. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196
F.3d 409, 431 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that evidence of religious teachings and tenets,
submitted not to determine their validity, but to establish the factual predicates of a
civil cause of action is properly allowed and does not violate the First Amendment);
Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375
(N.D. Iowa 1997); Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66 (D.
Conn. 1995); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex.
1995); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
6. Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 365.
7. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in 35
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 2-24 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
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been elusive.8 Nevertheless, through the First Amendment, the
"just bounds" required between government and religion emerged:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ." By these sixteen
words, the Framers of the Constitution pronounced one of our
most important, but elusive rights.
I. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Actions Speak Louder (and Mean More) Than Words
The Supreme Court first applied the principles behind the First
Amendment nearly 125 years ago, in Reynolds v. United States.1"
In Reynolds, the Court held that a statute prohibiting polygamy
could be applied constitutionally to those whose religious beliefs
commanded the practice." In so doing, the Court recognized that
while the law may not govern beliefs, it can, and must, govern
actions:
Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his
religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such
circumstances.' 2
Thus, the formation and development of First Amendment juris-
prudence began. While phrased or emphasized differently, the
same core principle holds as true today as it did over one-hundred
years ago when enacted; the Free Exercise clause "embraces two
concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is ab-
solute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."' 3 As
the Supreme Court more recently explained:
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the
record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence
8. See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
11. Id. at 166.
12. Id. at 166-67.
13. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); see Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (stating that the First Amendment protects "first and
foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.").
CHURCHES SEEKING SANCTUARY
contradicts that proposition .... We first had occasion to assert
that principle in Reynolds v. United States, where we rejected
the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be con-
stitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the
practice. "Laws," we said, "are made for the government of ac-
tions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices ....
Therefore, while the freedom to follow a religion is unqualified,
the freedom to act pursuant to that religion is not. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine a more compelling reason for limiting the right to
act when the action or conduct includes unleashing a known
pedophile into a community.
B. The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Cannot Commit a
Tort with Impunity
In cases involving allegations of sexual abuse against a priest or
religious institution, the Free Exercise analysis must start with the
basic and universal premise that religious organizations are liable
for their torts.1 5 In order to raise a Free Exercise claim, the church
defendant must show coercion of a sincerely held religious belief.16
Put another way, the issue is whether the conduct sought to be reg-
ulated is "rooted in religious belief."17 Generally, negligent em-
ployment claims in these cases involve the limited issue of whether
the church defendant's decision to place a known child abuser in an
unsupervised position, where he was allowed to counsel, teach, or
administer to parish youth, is conduct based upon a sincerely-held
religious belief.18 The church defendant, therefore, must argue that
its religious beliefs, disciplines, and government truly required, en-
couraged, or even authorized the church defendant to place a vul-
nerable child in the hands of a known pedophile. 19 It defies
14. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67).
15. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 319 (Colo. 1993);
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d
1235, 1237-38 (Ohio 1988); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App.
1989).
16. See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
17. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
18. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 287-
88 (Ky. 1998).
19. The recent well publicized statements by the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops in Dallas stands in stark contrast to any such claim. See PBS Online New-
sHour: Catholic Panel Recommends Defrocking Abusive Priests (June 4, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/catholic060402.html (last visited May
15, 2003); see also United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Bishops' President
2004]
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credulity, and the furthest stretch of the imagination, that such a
decision could be made based on a sincerely held religious belief.20
Church defendants cannot claim that such conduct is mandated,
authorized, or even supported by church law, or that it is in any
way based upon a sincerely held religious belief. Thus, church de-
fendants have no standing to even challenge the negligent employ-
ment claims based upon the free exercise of religion.2 1
Even if a church defendant could assert a burden on some relig-
ious conduct, it is well established that the "right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).'" 22 Negligent employment tort law is a
valid and neutral law of general applicability to all employers.23 In
these cases, plaintiffs simply seek that this law be applied to the
church defendants in the same manner it is applied to all
employers.
Accordingly, a church defendant does not have the right, under
the guise of the Free Exercise clause, to place priests it knew were
sexual predators in positions of authority where they can victimize
parishioners. A religious institution does not have the right to
break the law under the Free Exercise clause, or any other First
Amendment principle.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ABSTENTION
The Supreme Court has developed a limited doctrine of judicial
abstention, based upon the Free Exercise clause, which precludes
Issues Statement on Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests (Feb. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.usccb.org/commlarchives/2002/02-027.htm (last visited May 15, 2003).
20. See Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 338 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998);
Destafano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 283-84 (Colo. 1988); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d
347, 358 (Fla. 2002); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997).
21. See EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 286 (5th Cir.
1981) ("[S]ince the Seminary does not hold any religious tenet that requires discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex, race, color, or national origin, the application of Title VII
reporting requirements to it does not directly burden the exercise of any sincerely
held religious belief.").
22. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
23. "If the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest." Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). Rarely is this
the situation in these cases.
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civil courts from interfering in certain intra-church disputes.24
Church defendants sometimes attempt to draw sexual abuse cases
under the umbrella of judicial abstention doctrine by broadly
claiming that any inquiry or entanglement by a secular judiciary
into the internal policy, doctrine, and organization of a church is
prohibited.25
The Supreme Court, however, has established clear parameters
for the abstention doctrine, which only bars judicial review of
church decisions addressing purely ecclesiastical matters, in disputes
between factions of the church that have agreed to be governed by
church law.26 The Court has refused to extend judicial abstention
doctrine to cases that may be resolved through "neutral principles
of law."' 27 Moreover, the doctrine does not have any application to
purely secular disputes governed by civil law between third parties
and a particular defendant, albeit a religious organization, because
these cases do not require the state to become entangled in essen-
tially religious controversies, or intervene on behalf of groups es-
pousing particular doctrinal beliefs.28
The Supreme Court first established the doctrine of judicial ab-
stention in Watson v. Jones, a case involving a dispute between the
National Presbyterian Church and a local church over possession
of church property.29 The Supreme Court, upholding the decision
of the national church, stated:
In this country the full and free right to entartain [sic] any relig-
ious belief, to practice any religious principle and to teach any
religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and
property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is con-
ceded to all .... The right to organize voluntary religious as-
sociations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any
religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of con-
troverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ec-
clesiastical government of all the individual members,
congregations, and officers within the general association, is un-
questioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with
an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit
to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total
24. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871).
25. See generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the De-
cline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 228-31 (2000).
26. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-29.
27. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
28. Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin., United Methodist Church v. Cal. Superior
Court, 439 U.S. 1369, 1372-73 (1978).
29. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727.
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subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one
of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have
them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and
of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions
arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding
in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance ....3
Under Watson, churches are free to decide for themselves and
civil courts will not interfere with disputes: 1) that are between in-
ternal factions of the church body; 2) where the parties have im-
pliedly consented to be bound by the church governance; 3) where
the dispute is governed by controverted questions of faith; and 4)
where the church does not "violate the laws of morality and prop-
erty and ... does not infringe personal rights.
31
Watson, however, clearly limited the judicial abstention doctrine.
When a civil right hinges upon an ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil
court, not the ecclesiastical court, which adjudicates the civil right.
But the civil tribunal tries only the civil right, and refrains from
addressing any issues out of which the dispute arises.32 The Su-
preme Court further noted that:
[I]t may very well be conceded that if the General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church should undertake to try one of its
members for murder, and punish him with death or imprison-
ment, its sentence would be of no validity in a civil court or any-
where else. Or if it should at the instance of one of its members
entertain jurisdiction as between him and another member as to
their individual right to property, real or personal, the right in
no sense depending on ecclesiastical questions, its decision
would be utterly disregarded by any civil court where it might be
set up.33
Thus, under Watson, the church may govern itself any way it
chooses; if church action violates a plaintiff's civil rights, however,
civil law, not church law, controls.
The Judicial abstention doctrine, as established in Watson, has
been applied by the Supreme Court on several occasions.34 In each
30. Id. at 728-29 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 728.
32. Id. at 730 (citing Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. 87 (Speers Eq. 1843)).
33. Id. at 733.
34. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25
(1976) (applying abstention doctrine to internal dispute over internal church power
struggle); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1969) (applying abstention doctrine to intra-church
schism resulting in dispute over ownership of church property); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (applying abstention doctrine to internal
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instance, the case met the criteria established in Watson: 1) the dis-
putes were between internal factions of the church; 2) resolution of
the disputes were governed by controverted issues involving the
interpretation and application of church law; 3) the parties had im-
pliedly or expressly agreed to be bound by the church's decision;
and 4) the church action did not violate civil law property or per-
sonal rights.35 In cases meeting these criteria, the Supreme Court
has adopted and applied the constitutional mandate that "civil
courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories
of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of disci-
pline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law. "36
Generally, plaintiffs do not argue that a church does not have
the right to govern itself, and to determine and apply church rules,
customs, or law as it sees fit in the internal governance of the
church. Rather, plaintiffs allege that a church's actions caused sec-
ular harm in violation of the plaintiff's civil rights-a harm to
which the civil law applies.
The limited scope of the judicial abstention doctrine, even in in-
tra-church dispute cases, has been firmly established by the Su-
preme Court. In Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., the Supreme Court
was again asked to determine which of the factions of the church
should control the local churches and their property.37 The trial
court decided in favor of the local church and the regional church
appealed, claiming that this decision was contrary to the position of
the hierarchical church, and, therefore, violated the judicial absten-
tion doctrine of the First Amendment.38 The Supreme Court re-
fused to apply the judicial abstention doctrine because resolution
of the dispute was not based upon "inquiry into religious doctrine,"
but upon civil law property rights principles.39 The Court affirmed
that the judicial abstention doctrine was not applicable where the
church dispute between mother church in Russia and United States faction over con-
trol of St. Nicholas Cathedral); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1,
16 (1929) (applying abstention doctrine to internal church dispute over whether mem-
ber was entitled to appointment of a chaplaincy).
35. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 728; see also supra text accompanying note 31.
36. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713 (emphasis added).
37. Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
38. Id. at 367-68.
39. Id. at 368.
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dispute may be decided by application of "neutral principles of
law." 40
Similarly, plaintiffs' negligence claims are not governed by the
church law, but by the civil law applicable to all employers. Even if
some inquiry into the customs and practices of a church were in-
volved, the abstention doctrine still would not grant the church
immunity.
This limitation is authoritatively illustrated in General Council
on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist Church v.
Superior Court of California, where the Methodist Church chal-
lenged a California state court's jurisdiction to hear a dispute aris-
ing out of damage claims for breach of contract, fraud, and
violations of state security laws.41 The Methodist Church claimed
that:
[TIhe Superior Court violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments in basing its assertion of jurisdiction on respondents'
characterization of applicant's role in the structure of the Meth-
odist Church and rejecting contrary testimony of church officials
and experts and statements set forth in the Book of Discipline,
which contains the constitution and by-laws of the Methodist
Church.42
Justice Rehnquist, later Chief Justice, summarily rejected this ar-
gument, stating, in accordance with established precedent:
There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil
court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical
cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes. But
this Court never has suggested that those constraints similarly
apply outside the context of such intraorganization disputes.
Thus, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese and the other cases
40. See id. at 370 (Brennan, Marshall, J., concurring); Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)
(holding that civil courts are the proper tribunals for resolving internal church prop-
erty disputes where those disputes may be resolved by "neutral principals" of civil
law.); see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605-06 (1979). The Court stated:
We cannot agree.., that the First Amendment requires the States to adopt a
rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church prop-
erty disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved. ...
The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to "inhibit" the free exercise
of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing
the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or purchase
goods.
Id. (emphasis added).
41. Gen. Council on Fin.. & Admin., United Methodist Church v. Superior Court
of Cal., 439 U.S. 1355, 1369 (1978).
42. Id. at 1370.
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cited by applicant are not in point. Those cases are premised on
a perceived danger that in resolving intrachurch disputes the
State will become entangled in essentially religious controver-
sies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctri-
nal beliefs. Such considerations are not applicable to purely
secular disputes between third parties and a particular defen-
dant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud,
breach of contract, and statutory violations are alleged.43
When applying Supreme Court precedent concerning limited ju-
dicial abstention doctrine, it becomes clear that the doctrine is in-
applicable in church sex abuse cases. Unlike the cases holding that
judicial abstention applies, church sex abuse cases: 1) do not in-
volve a plaintiff who has agreed to be bound by church law or a
negligent church decision on this issue; 2) do not require courts to
"become entangled in essentially religious controversies"; 3) do not
require courts to "intervene on behalf of groups espousing particu-
lar doctrinal beliefs"; 4) do not involve allegations that the church
violated church law, policy or practice, only allegations that the
church violated the civil law; and 5) involve church action in viola-
tion of a plaintiff's civil rights that resulted in secular harm. Thus,
none of the essential requisites for application of the judicial ab-
stention doctrine are applicable in church sex abuse cases.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has uniformly concluded that the
First Amendment was never intended to prohibit state action for
the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and
morals of society.44 The abstention doctrine, as consistently inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, simply does not grant constitutional
immunity to churches for the harm caused by their secular torts.
43. Id. at 1372-73 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Federal circuit courts of
appeal are in accord. See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d
940, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1999). In Bollard, the court stated:
Because there is no protected-choice rationale at issue, we intrude no fur-
ther on church autonomy in allowing this [sexual harassment] case to pro-
ceed than we do, for example, in allowing parishioners' civil suits against a
church for the negligent supervision of ministers who have subjected them to
inappropriate sexual behavior.
Id.; see Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2d
Cir. 1999); Sander v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998).
44. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-05 (1983); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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Ill. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Establishment Clause states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .... ,45 This simple recita-
tion of an important ideal governing our society has been the
source of extensive legal battles. The case law addressing the issue
of sexual abuse by clergy, however, is quite clear, that like the Free
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause provides no shelter for
the church.
The parameters of the Establishment Clause are well defined.
The Supreme Court has held that a state action does not violate the
Establishment Clause if such action: 1) has a secular purpose; 2)
has a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and 3) does not foster excessive state entanglement with religion.46
The first two prongs of the test are rarely implicated in abuse cases.
Enforcing one's common law rights is purely secular. Furthermore,
the primary effect of abuse cases neither advances, nor inhibits re-
ligion, because the church is simply held to the same standard as
any other entity. Rather, the primary focus in abuse cases is placed
on whether or not the case involves excessive governmental entan-
glement with religion. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the first two
prongs is necessary in order to fully explain their purpose and to
make clear that neither apply.
A. Is the Law Secular in Purpose and What Is
Its Primary Effect?
In applying the secular purpose test, it is appropriate to ask if the
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of relig-
ion.47 Moreover, a law needs only to have a secular purpose. In
other words, a law is invalid under the secular purpose prong when
"there [is] no question that the statute or activity was motivated
wholly by religious considerations. '49 Even if a law is motivated in
part by a religious purpose, it may still be valid, as long as it is not
entirely motivated to advance religion.50 Thus, if a law has some
minute secular purpose, it cannot fail the secular purpose prong.
For a law to be declared unconstitutional under the "effects"
prong, "it must be fair to say that the government itself has ad-
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
47. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55 (1985).
48. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 614-15 (1987).
49. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)).
50. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55.
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vanced religion through its own activities and influence. ' 51 "[F]or
the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity. 5
2
Some of the most common claims in sex abuse cases are battery,
negligent supervision, negligent retention, and breach of fiduciary
duty. These are causes of action that exist due to common law.
They doubtlessly have a clear secular purpose-the protection of
children from abusive church leaders. This in no way results in
governmental advancement of religion. Rather, the law simply
holds the church to the same civil law standards as any other entity.
In abuse cases, there can be no claim that the law is non-secular in
purpose, or that its effect is to advance religion. Similarly, there is
no claim that the law requires excessive entanglement with
religion.
B. Is There Excessive Entanglement with Religion?
Church sex abuse cases do not involve "excessive entanglement"
with religion. In Lemon, the Supreme Court was concerned that
the state action may result in administrative and political entangle-
ment.53 Administrative entanglement typically involves compre-
hensive, discriminating, and continual state surveillance of
religion.54 Of particular concern is the danger that government ac-
tion may have "self-perpetuating and self-expanding propensi-
ties." 55 This generally occurs when the state grants regulated aid to
groups affiliated with religious institutions, thus requiring ongoing
monitoring.5 6
Generally, sex abuse cases require a single inquiry, under neutral
principles of law, into whether the church negligently supervised a
priest. There is no threat or necessity of the state's on going moni-
51. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987).
52. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
53. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-22 (1971).
54. Id. at 619.
55. Id. at 624.
56. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-14 (1985) (holding program that
funded public employees teaching in parochial schools required on-site monitoring by
public authorities and coordinated planning by public and religious authorities).
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toring of the church's employment decisions. Thus, no excessive
entanglement is at issue.57
Unfortunately, this is often the point where state court analysis
under the First Amendment goes awry. In Gibson v. Brewer, for
example, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the Establishment
Clause precluded church liability for negligent supervision of a
priest.58 In so ruling, the court stated:
Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church's supervision of a
cleric-what the church "should know"-requires inquiry into
religious doctrine ... [T]his would create an excessive entangle-
ment, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one
model of supervision.59
By so ruling, the Gibson court failed to perform the single in-
quiry versus comprehensive, discriminating, and continual inquiries
described in Lemon.6" This is especially critical because the Estab-
lishment Clause has always tolerated some level of entanglement
between churches and secular law.61 Only "excessive" entangle-
ments, those that are comprehensive, discriminating, and continual,
are prohibited. 62 Had the Gibson court completed its analysis, it
would have concluded that the single inquiry, under neutral princi-
ples of employment law regarding negligent supervision, did not
pose an excessive entanglement under Lemon and its progeny.63
Additionally, when a church asserts a First Amendment defense,
it is essentially advocating for blanket immunity. A good argument
can be made that granting such immunity from common law re-
sponsibility to church employers, but not to secular employers,
would itself raise grave Establishment Clause issues. Such a law
would have no secular purpose, and would certainly have the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion by immunizing churches from
57. Id.; see NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1304 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding
no entanglement where the NLRB's jurisdiction over a church-owned school required
government involvement only with respect to specific claims filed on behalf of specific
employees); United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316, 324 (1st Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that IRS investigation into a church's tax exempt status did not constitute govern-
mental entanglement); Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649
N.W.2d 426, 434-36 (Minn. 2002) (holding that a claim of negligent counseling against
a member of the clergy did not require any entanglement; rather it was a dispute that
could be resolved according to neutral principles of tort law).
58. Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997).
59. Id.
60. 403 U.S. at 619-24.
61. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
62. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20.
63. Unfortunately, similar reasoning can be found in other states. See, e.g., Prit-
ziaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 791-92 (Wis. 1995).
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tort liability for the public harm that they have caused, in violation
of the first two prongs of the Lemon test.
CONCLUSION
Interpreting the First Amendment to provide church defendants
complete immunity from sexual abuse claims not only perverts its
plain language and ignores Supreme Court jurisprudence, but also
places the safety of religious institutions above the safety of all citi-
zens. It would make the children in our society, the most innocent
and unsuspecting among us, a less precious commodity than the
theology of a church. This cannot be so. Religious entities should
not receive special treatment, nor be held to a lower standard
under the law. They, like any other corporation, must not be
placed above the law. Indeed, our nation's history and manner of
government leaves no doubt that a state has the power and is free
to regulate actions and practices, especially those actions which
harm innocent children. This necessarily includes the power to
punish and deter subversive action, such as sexual abuse, if such
action should be attempted by a cleric.' For neither a cleric's
robe, nor a pulpit is a defense.
64. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94,
109 (1952).
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